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Abstract. The present essay discusses the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of design science. It suggests that Information Systems as a
design science should be based on a sound ontology, including an ontology of
IT artifacts. In the case of epistemology, the essay emphasizes the irreducibility of the prescriptive knowledge of IT artifacts to theoretical descriptive
knowledge. It also expresses a need for constructive research methods, which
allow disciplined, rigorous and transparent building of IT artifacts as outcomes
of design science research. The relationship between action research and
design science research is also briefly discussed. In the case of ethics, the
essay points out that Information Systems as design science cannot be valuefree.
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1 Introduction
Design science research has been practiced in Computer Science, Software
Engineering and Information Systems for decades. Right from the beginning
© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2007, 19(2):39-64
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computer scientists have developed new architectures for computers, new programming languages, new compilers, new algorithms, new data and file structures, new data models, new database management systems, and so on. In
short, they have been doing design science research all the time. Much of the
early research in Information Systems (IS) was focused on systems development approaches and methods, e.g. the socio-technical approach (Bostrom and
Heinen 1977; Mumford 1983), and the infological approach (Langefors 1966;
Sundgren 1973; Lundeberg et al. 1978), representing design science research,
too.
During the last 25 years, however, mainstream IS research has lost sight of
its design science origin, because of the hegemony of the North-American
business-school-oriented IS researchers over the leading IS publication outlets
(such as MIS Quarterly, founded 1977; ICIS, started in 1980; and Information
Systems Research, founded in 1991). The dominant research philosophy has
been to develop cumulative, theory-based research to be able to make prescriptions. It seems that this ‘theory-with-practical-implications’ research
strategy has seriously failed to produce results that are of real interest in practice. A pilot analysis of the practical recommendations made in articles in
MISQ between 1996 and 2000 showed that these were weak (Iivari et al.
2004).
The current interest in design science (Nunamaker et al. 1990; 1991; Walls
et al. 1992; March and Smith 1995; Hevner et al. 2004), may change the situation. It may again become legitimate to do design science research and to get it
published in first-tier IS journals. But it is equally important that the above
seminal papers have turned our attention to how to do design science research.
One can expect that this will make future design science research more rigorous and researchers more reflective over the research process.
In my dissertation (Iivari 1983), which was essentially a piece of design
science work, I characterized Information Systems (or Data Processing Science) as an applied science, and I was hardly the first to do so.1 Nowadays this
view is becoming widely accepted, even on the opposite side of the Atlantic,
as evidenced by this quote from Benbasat and Zmud:
our focus should be on how to best design IT artifacts and IS systems to
increase their compatibility, usefulness, and ease of use or on how to best manage and support IT or IT-enabled business initiatives. (Benbasat and Zmud
2003, p. 191) [italics added by JI]

One can claim that design science has been implicit in this old conception
of Information Systems as an applied science or discipline. When working on
the idea of paradigms of IS development approaches or schools of thought
(Iivari 1991), I was strongly influenced by my design science background.
40 • J. Iivari
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Although I applied the framework of Burrell and Morgan (1979) as an analytical device, I expanded it in two respects. I included the ethics of research as an
explicit analytical dimension and I incorporated constructive research to complement the nomothetic and idiographic research recognized by Burrell and
Morgan (op.cit.). Both these extensions reflected my design science background.
The purpose of the present essay is to revisit the paradigmatic framework
of Iivari (1991), applying it specifically to design science research. The framework distinguishes the ontology, epistemology, methodology and ethics of
research. This essay suggests that Information Systems as a design science
should be based on a sound ontology, and proposes the three worlds of Popper
(1978) as a useful starting point for such an ontology. The paper suggests a
three-level epistemology for Information Systems (conceptual knowledge,
descriptive knowledge and prescriptive knowledge). It emphasizes the prescriptive knowledge of IT artifacts as a distinct knowledge area that cannot be
reduced to descriptive knowledge. The essay expresses the need for constructive research methods, which allow the disciplined, rigorous and transparent building of IT artifacts as outcomes of design science research and
make it possible to distinguish Information Systems as a design science from
the practice of developing IT artifacts. The discussion on the relationship
between action research and design science research emphasizes historical,
practical, ontological, epistemological and methodological differences
between the two research approaches. In the case of ethics, the essay points
out that Information Systems as design science cannot be value-free and distinguishes three ethical positions for design science research: means-end oriented, interpretive and critical. The whole essay is summarized in twelve
theses.

2 Ontology of Design Science
Design science research should be based on a sound ontology. Popper’s
(1978) three worlds provide a good starting point. World 1 is about material
nature, World 2 about consciousness and mental states, and World 3 about
products of human social action (Table 1). World 3 clearly includes human
artifacts, and it also covers institutions and theories. Institutions are social
constructions that have been objectified (Berger and Luckman 1967). While it
is meaningful to speak about truth or ‘truthlikeness’ (Niiniluoto 1999) in the
case of theories, it is not in the case of artifacts. Artifacts are only more or less
useful for human purposes.2
J. Iivari • 41
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The disciplines of computing are specifically interested in IT artifacts
(Dahlbom 1996; Orlikowski and Iacono 2001; Benbasat and Zmud 2003).
Dahlbom (1996) adopts a very broad and possibly confusing interpretation of
the concept of artifact, claiming that “people and their lives are themselves
artifacts, constructed, and the major material in that construction is technology” (p. 43). Referring more to IT, he continues:
When we say we study artifacts, it is not computers or computer systems we
mean, but information technology use, conceived as a complex and changing
combine of people and technology. To think of this combine as an artifact
means to approach it with a design attitude, asking questions like: Could this
be different? What is wrong with it? How could it be improved? (p. 43).

He also claims that we should conceive of our discipline in terms of “using
information technology” instead of “developing information systems” (p. 34).
World

Explanation

World 1: Nature

Research phenomena

Examples

IT artifacts + World 1

Evaluation of IT artifacts
against natural phenomena
Evaluation of IT artifacts
against perceptions, consciousness and mental states
Evaluation of organizational
information systems
New types of theories made
possible by IT artifacts
Evaluation of the performance of artifacts comprising embedded computing

World 2: Consciousness and IT artifacts + World 2
mental states
World 3:

Institutions
Theories
Artifacts
• IT artifacts
• IT applications
• meta IT artifacts

IT artifacts + World 3
Institutions
IT artifacts + World 3
Theories
IT artifacts + World 3
Artifacts

Table 1: An ontology for design science

It was Orlikowski and Iacono (2001), however, who popularized the phrase
‘IT artifact’ within the IS research community. They define IT artifacts as
“bundles of material and cultural properties packaged in some socially recognizable form such as hardware and/or software” (p. 121). Based on the 188
articles published in Information Systems Research in the decade beginning in
1990 and ending in 1999, they distinguish 13 views of IT artifacts. Most of
these conceptualizations treat them as black boxes, without looking inside
them. They simply focus on the computational capabilities of IT artifacts (the
computational view of technology), their intended uses (the tool view of technology), technology as a variable (the proxy view of technology), how tech42 • J. Iivari
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nologies come into being or how technologies come to be used (the ensemble
view of technology).
It is my contention that Information Systems as a design science should be
based on a sound typology of IT artifacts, and especially of IT applications.
March and Smith (1995), echoed by Hevner et al. (2004), provide a classification of IT artifacts into constructs, models, methods and instantiations. In a
way, this is a very general classification that can be applied to any IT systems.
Unfortunately, its application is not always straightforward, since the
classification so strongly reflects data/information modelling.
If we conceive of Information Systems as a design science that also builds
IT artifacts, a natural question is what sort of artifacts we build, especially if
we wish to distinguish Information Systems from Computer Science and Software Engineering. Research into the diffusion of innovations provides an initial typology of IT artifacts. Lyytinen and Rose (2003), refining Swanson
(1994), distinguish base innovations, systems development innovations, and
services. Services cover administrative process innovations (such as accounting systems), technological process innovations (such as MRP), technological
service innovations (such as remote customer order entries) and technological
integration innovations (such as EDI).
In my view the primary interest of Information Systems lies in IT applications. I propose a typology for IT applications which provides an alternative
categorization of services to that in Lyytinen and Rose (2003). The typology
distinguishes seven archetypes of IT applications (Table 2) based on the function/role the application serves.
Role/function

Metaphors

Examples

To automate

Processor

To augment

Tool (proper)

To mediate

Medium

To informate

Information
source

To entertain

Game

Computer games

To artisticize

Piece of art

Computer art

To accompany

Pet

Digital (virtual and robotic) pets

Many embedded systems
Many transaction processing systems
Many personal productivity systems; Computer
aided design
E-mail, instant messaging, chat rooms, blogs
Electronic storage systems (e.g. CDs and DVDs)
Information systems proper

Table 2: Archetypes of IT applications

J. Iivari • 43
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The first four functions of Table 2 are close to ‘technology as a labour substitution tool’, ‘technology as a productivity tool’, ‘technology as a social relations tool’ and ‘technology as an information processing tool’ in the view of
Orlikowksi and Iacono (2001). The roles ‘to automate’ and ‘to informate’
come from Zuboff (1988). Computer games illustrate the capability of IT
applications to entertain. IT applications may also attempt to arouse artistic
experience, and one can easily imagine a new sort of art that is essentially built
on the interactive character of computer technology. Finally, IT artifacts such
as digital pets can accompany human users.
To clarify Table 2, one should note that it interprets an information system
proper as being a system whose purpose “is to supply its groups of users (...)
with information about a set of topics to support their activities.” (Gustafsson
et al., 1982, p.100). The definition implies that an information system is specific to the organizational (or inter-organizational) context in which it is
implemented. Information content is also a central aspect of any information
system to be designed.
The seven archetypes of IT applications are ideal types, and as such they
may not occur in practice in their pure forms. A single application may include
several functions. A word processor, for example, is primarily a tool intended
to augment text production. At the same time it automates some aspects of text
production (e.g. spelling). Zuboff (1988) claimed that to automate also allows
one to informate. This can obviously be extended to cover other types of IT
applications, so that computer games, for example, could at least in principle
collect information about the users’ actions and reactions during playing
which can be used to develop the game further. A second point is that many IT
applications with the primary role of automating, augmenting, entertaining or
possibly artisticizing may include an information system that supports the use
of the primary functionality. E-mail, for example, with the original function of
communicating messages, includes mailboxes that allow one to build a directory to informate about previous communications. Thus it can be developed
into a fairly sophisticated information system about one’s electronically mediated social network and electronic communication within that network.
It is obvious that IT artifacts differ in design. A compiler design, for example, is quite different from the design of a specific information system, and
design of an information system differs from game design. Swanson (1994)
and Lyytinen and Rose (2003) suggest that IT artifacts differ in their diffusion,
and it is my conjecture that IT application archetypes also differ in their
acceptance, so that the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis et al. 1989;
Venkatesh et al. 2003) is valid only in the case of some IT application artifacts.
Returning to Popper’s ontology, one should note that IT artifacts have
increasingly invaded all spheres of the world (see Table 1). They may be
44 • J. Iivari
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embedded in natural objects of World 1, to measure physical states of objects,
for example. Nanocomputing in particular is expected to open up totally new
opportunities in this respect, since nanocomputers may be included in single
cells of biological organisms, for example. How these IT artifacts affect
natural phenomena is likely to become a significant research problem in the
future. One can also deduce that IT artifacts have also invaded our consciousness and mental states, affecting our perceptions of the world, including the IT
artifacts themselves. IT artifacts such as embedded computers are nowadays
integral parts of other artifacts such as cars, TVs, phones, etc., and ubiquitous
computing will intensify this. Information systems are significant constituents
of institutions such as organizations and societies. The increasing capacity of
computers has made it feasible to develop computationally more and more
complex theories. One can also imagine that IT artifacts make it possible to
develop totally new types of theories that cannot be represented using any
other medium than computers, even though I do not have any specific
examples in mind.
It is obvious that the research phenomena of Table 1 have an influence on
the epistemology and methodology of Information Systems as a design science. For example, if an IT artifact is evaluated against natural phenomena of
World 1 (e.g. how does the use of a mobile phone affect one’s brain temperature?), against perceptions of World 2 (e.g. how does the use of a mobile
phone affect one’s perception of time and space?), against other artifacts (e.g.
how does the use of mobile phones affect airplanes?), or against institutions of
World 3 (e.g. how do mobile phones affect the nature of work in organizations), different facts and theories are involved, different research methods are
applicable, and knowledge with different limits is achievable.

3 Epistemology of Design Science
Several proponents of design science suggest that it is associated with pragmatism as a philosophical orientation in its attempt to bridge science and practical action (March and Smith 1995; Hevner et al. 2004; Cole et al., 2005). In
my view we should not conclude that design science necessarily implies the
notion of truth from pragmatism as practical utility. To me, artifacts, if theories
are excluded, do not have any truth value, and theories that describe and
explain reality outside our mind have truth as correspondence (Niiniluoto,
1999). If practical action informed by a theory consistently proves to be successful, it provides additional evidence that there is at least a grain of truth in
the theory (Bunge, 1967b).3 In my dissertation (Iivari, 1983) I adapted LehtoJ. Iivari • 45
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vuori’s (1973) framework from economics to structure IS research. Based on
Chmielewicz (1970), Lehtovuori distinguishes four levels of research: the
conceptual level, descriptive level (of economic theory), prescriptive level (of
economic policy) and normative level (of economic philosophy).4 The
research goal at the conceptual level is essentialist: concepts and conceptual
frameworks at this level aim at identifying essences in the research territory
and their relationships. They do not have any truth value or truthlikeness, but
they may be more or less useful when developing theories at the descriptive
level (Bunge 1967a). The descriptive level aims at describing, understanding
and explaining how things are. Following Törnebohm (1975), one can distinguish observational research, predictive research and explanatory research at
the descriptive level. The prescriptive level is interested in how things could
be and how to achieve the specified ends in an effective manner. It produces
alternative ‘methods’ (or means) to achieve certain utilitarian ends. It may be
that today I would call these ‘methods’ artifacts, even though not all ‘methods’
need be artifacts.5 Artifacts and recommendations as such do not have a truth
Type of knowledge

Illustrations

Conceptual knowledge (no truth value)
• concepts, constructs
• classifications, taxonomies, typologies,
• conceptual frameworks

c1, c2, … cn, C1, C2, … Cn
U = C1∪…∪Cn; Ci∩Cj=∅, i≠ j
Systems concepts, ontologies, etc.

Descriptive knowledge (truth value)
• observational facts
• empirical regularities
• theories and hypotheses

}

causal laws
• X causes A in situation B
(Niiniluoto 1993) • X tends to cause A in situation

B with probability p
Prescriptive knowledge (no truth value)
Design product knowledge

The artifact:
•
•
•
•

Design process knowledge: Technological rules
(Bunge 1967b)
Technical norms (Niiniluoto 1993)

idea, concept, style
functionality, behaviour
architecture, structure
possible instantiation

In order to achieve A
• do (act1, act2, …, actn)

If you want A, and you believe
that you are in a situation B, then
• you should do X
• it is rational for you to do X
• it is profitable for you to do X

Table 3: Epistemology of design science

46 • J. Iivari
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or truth-like value, but only statements about their efficiency and effectiveness
have such a value.
This three-level structure can be used to structure knowledge produced by
IS research (Table 3). Conceptual knowledge includes concepts, both singular
(ci) and more general class concepts (Cj), classifications, taxonomies, typologies, clusters, etc. (Bailey 1994; Bunge 1967a; Doty and Glick 1994) and
more general conceptual frameworks such as the infological concepts of
Langefors (1966), the Bunge-Wand-Weber ontology (Wand and Weber, 1990)
and classifications of IT innovations (Swanson 1994; Lyytinen and Rose
2003), to mention just a few. As these examples illustrate, much of the knowledge produced by IS research is conceptual by nature.
Observational facts such as who invented what and when, Moore’s Law
and the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis et al. 1989) illustrate descriptive knowledge. Empirical regularities and explanatory theories allow one to
identify causal laws (Niiniluoto 1993) either deterministic (‘X causes A in situation B’) or probabilistic (‘X tends to cause A in situation B with probability
p’).
Relatively speaking, prescriptive knowledge is the least well understood
form of knowledge in Table 3. The distinction between design product knowledge and design process knowledge is borrowed from Walls et al. (1992).
Design product knowledge in particular seems to be missing from philosophical treatments such as Bunge (1967b) and Niiniluoto (1993). The three aspects
of design product knowledge In Table 3 are close to the three criteria of artifacts identified by Beckman (2002): intentional, operational and structural.
Beckman illustrates these in the case of ‘knifehood’. The intentional criterion
implies that a thing is a knife because it is used as a knife. The operational criterion means that a thing is a knife because it works like a knife. The structural
criterion suggests that a thing is a knife because it has the shape and fabric of a
knife. Beckman (2002) also includes a fourth criterion, the conventional one.
It implies that a thing is a knife because it fits the reference of the common
concept of ‘knife. In the design science research context the conventional criterion is a significant goal in the sense that the artifact (e.g. a new systems
development method OO+++) will be accepted as a valid instance of some
class concept (e.g. object-oriented methods) by a relevant community (e.g. by
practitioners). Despite this, I do not think that it is an inherent aspect of the
artifact, since the artifact may achieve general community acceptance years
after its invention and construction. Therefore the conventional criterion is not
explicitly in Table 3, but it in a way the criterion is covered at the conceptual
level (type or class of a meta-artifact). Following March and Smith (1995) I
have added possible instantiation as a fouth aspect.
J. Iivari • 47
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Bunge (1967b) identifies technological rules as central constituents of
knowledge in applied sciences. A technological rule is a sequence of acts that
prescribe how one should proceed in order to achieve a predetermined goal.
While simplistic in its sequential nature, it can be considered a ‘prototype’ of
design process knowledge. Although one might interpret a technological rule
as covering how to construct a design product, it only very implicitly includes
knowledge of the design product. One should also note that a technological
rule in itself is an artifact. If a technological rule describes how to build a complex artifact, it is in itself probably fairly complex as an artifact, too. Bunge
(1967b) does not address the question of how to build technological rules as
artifacts.
Niiniluoto (1993) suggests that the old dichotomy between basic research
and applied research should be replaced by a distinction between descriptive
science and design science, based on different knowledge claims. While the
typical knowledge claims of descriptive science are deterministic or probabilistic causal laws, design science comprises technical norms, as illustrated in
Table 3. Technical norms link recommendations at the prescriptive level to
causal laws at the descriptive level. One should note from the design science
viewpoint, however, that Niiniluoto is silent about design products (denoted
by X in Table 3). Although he gives some examples of X such as medical
treatments, fertilizers, materials used in airplanes, etc., he fails to recognize
design product knowledge as a separate category of knowledge in design science.
Niiniluoto’s technical norms give an impression that design science knowledge (technical norms) is largely reducible to descriptive knowledge (causal
laws). The relationship between science and technology has been of considerable interest (Gardner 1994; 1995), leading to the conclusion that descriptive
science and technology are separate, even though mutually interacting, bodies
of thought (Layton 1974). This seems to be so especially in Information Systems, where IT artifacts seem to be relatively independent of descriptive theories concerning technology, human beings, organizations and other
institutions. Even though technical implementability is a significant issue, the
dependence of IT artifacts on the laws of nature is mainly latent, and IS
designers do not need to constantly consider them. One can expect that the
need for theories of human beings is the most obvious in the context of
human-computer-interaction (HCI). However, the theoretical foundation of
HCI is unclear and fragmented (Clemmensen 2006). It is also uncertain to
what extent existing theories inform the HCI design either directly or indirectly through design methods, standards, guidelines, etc.
The situation in Information Systems is very similar. It has diversity of reference disciplines from which it has adopted a number of theories (Benbasat
48 • J. Iivari
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and Weber 1996; Hirschheim and Klein 2003), but these theories are weakly
linked to IT artifacts and their design. Despite this weak reliance on descriptive theories people design reasonably successful IT artifacts. This makes one
to wonder whether the IS research community tends to exaggerate to the significance of descriptive theoretical knowledge for prescriptive knowledge of
how to design IT successful artifacts. In conclusion, in line with Layton
(1974) I am inclined to suggest that prescriptive knowledge forms a knowledge realm of its own and is not reducible to descriptive knowledge.
It was Walls et al. (1992) who pioneered the idea in Information Systems
that design science should be rooted in theories. They suggested that an “IS
design theory’ for a product should consist of meta-requirements (the class of
goals to which the theory applies), meta-design (the class of artifacts hypothesized to meet the meta-requirements), kernel theories (theories from the
natural and social sciences governing design) and testable design product
hypotheses (used to test whether the meta-design satisfies the meta-requirements). An IS design theory for a process would comprise a design method (a
description of the procedures for artifact construction), kernel theories and
testable design process hypotheses (used to verify whether the design method
results in an artifact which is consistent with the meta-design).
Even though I am afraid that the strong theory orientation6 of the leading IS
journals may exaggerate the dependence of prescriptive knowledge on
descriptive knowledge, I would consider the existence of a kernel theory to be
a defining characteristic of a ‘design theory’. As a consequence, I claim that
without a sound kernel theory it is not justified to speak about ‘design theory’.
This is quite an ambitious requirement, because it is difficult, as Walls et al.
(1992) demonstrate, to find convincing examples of IT meta-artifacts with
well-defined kernel theories. As a result there seems to be some tendency to
soften the requirements for a kernel theory. Markus et al. (2002), for example,
allow any practitioner theory-in-use to serve as a kernel theory. This implies
that a design theory is not necessarily based on any scientifically validated
knowledge. Taking a cynical viewpoint, if kernel theory is forgotten, there is a
danger that the idea of a ‘design theory’ will be (mis)used just to make our
field sound more scientific without any serious attempt to strengthen the scientific foundation of the meta-artifacts proposed.7
The hierarchy of Table 3 can easily be mapped to the types of ‘theories’
suggested by Gregor (2006). ‘Theories for analyzing and predicting’ lie at
then conceptual level. ‘Theories for predicting’ are empirical regularities.
‘Theories for explaing and predicting’ refer to theories at the decriptive level.
‘Theories for design and action’ are at the prescriptive level. Only ‘theories of
explaining’ when interpreted in terms of grand theories such as Critical Social
Theory, Structuration Theory, Actor-Network Theory, Activity Theory, etc. do
J. Iivari • 49
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not have any correspondent in Table 3. Therefore, a fuller discussion of
knowledge at different levels is provided by in Gregor (2006).

4 Methodology of Design Science
As pointed out in the Introduction, much research in Computer Science and
Software Engineering in particular has consisted of constructing artifacts.
Recognizing this, I suggested ‘constructive research’ to denote the specific
research methods required for constructing artifacts (Iivari 1991). Well-known
classifications of IS research methods such as those of Benbasat (1985),
Jenkins (1985) and Galliers and Land (1987) do not recognize anything
resembling constructive research methods, nor, even, does a recent review of
research methods in the IS literature (Chen and Hirschheim 2004).
It is widely understood that building artifacts in design science research is
at least ideally creative (Nunamaker et al. 1990-1991; March and Smith 1995;
Hevner et al. 2004). One could maintain that it has a lot in common with theory building, which has been of considerable interest in the methodology of
science (e.g. Dubin 1969). One can speculate, however, that artifacts in particular leave much more space for creative imagination, since they are not
assumed to describe or explain any existing reality. IT artifacts may create
their own virtual world (e.g., computer games, computer art and computer
pets) where the laws of nature, for example, are not valid. Because of the creative element, it is difficult to define an appropriate method for the design science activity of artifact building.
Despite the above difficulty, I see the existence of constructive research
methods as highly essential for the identity for Information Systems as a
design science. It is the rigor of constructing IT artifacts that distinguishes
Information Systems as design science from the practice of building IT artifacts. One should note here that the construction of innovative IT artifacts (or
IT meta-artifacts) is not a monopoly of the research community, but practitioners may also do it. Acknowledging this, there are two options to demarcate
Information Systems as design science from inventions by practitioners. The
first is to accept that there is no constructive research method that distinguishes the two, but that the difference lies in the evaluation: the essence of
Information Systems as design science lies in the scientific evaluation of artifacts. This is one option, but it easily leads to reactive research in which
Information Systems as a design science focuses on the evaluation of existing
IT artifacts rather than on the building of new ones.

50 • J. Iivari
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The second option is to try to specify a reasonably rigorous constructive
research method for building IT artifacts. It would be this method that differentiates the design science construction of IT artifacts from the Gyro Gearloose style of invention in practice.8 If a practitioner applies the same rigor as
an IS researcher, he/she is essentially a researcher. I would expect that this
would make Information Systems as a design science more proactive,
attempting to lead the evolution of IT and not merely react to it.
I did not detail the method of constructive research in any way in Iivari
(1991), but at about the same time Nunamaker et al. (1990-1991) proposed
that systems development could serve as a specific research method for constructing artifacts. They introduced a model of four interacting research activities, theory building, experimentation, observation and systems
development, where systems development lies at the centre. The process that
they propose for systems development is quite a conventional software
development model. In as far as the artifacts to be built are systems, systems
development is a natural candidate for methods of constructive research. The
method seems particularly relevant when the purpose is to prove the concept
by implementing (instantiating) the system. One should note, however, that
not all artifacts developed in design science research within Computer Science, Information Systems and Software Engineering are information or software systems (e.g. systems development methods), and it is an open question
to what extent systems development methods work as research methods. If
systems development methods really are applicable in, this should put an end
to the regression of meta-levels between artifacts, as systems development
methods as meta-artifacts for the IS development process could be employed
for developing other meta-artifacts.
If we consider some pitfalls of the idea of systems development as a method of constructive research, the first question is whether systems development methods allow sufficient room for the creativity and serendipity that are
essential for innovation. This is always a significant concern when attempting
to make the building process more disciplined, rigorous and transparent.
Perhaps the most serious weakness of the model of Nunamaker et al.
(1990-1991) is that it integrates systems development quite weakly with other
research activities, i.e. theory building, experimentation and observation.
Their process model for systems development research consists of five stages:
construct a conceptual framework, develop a system architecture, analyse and
design the system, build the (prototype) system and observe and evaluate the
system. Only the first and the last stages of this process model are related to
other research activities, and the first stage only advises one to study relevant
disciplines for new approaches and ideas.
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Hevner et al. (2004) propose that the rigor of design science research is
derived from the effective use of prior research (existing knowledge base). I
would claim that the construction process should be made as transparent as
possible if it is to be considered a design science activity. It is not enough for
the artifact just to come out of the blue. I suggest four major sources of ideas
for design science research to make the origin more transparent:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Practical problems and opportunities
Existing artifacts
Analogies and metaphors
Theories

The first of these emphasizes the practical relevance of research. Furthermore, it is well-known in innovation diffusion research (Rogers 1995) that
customers serve as a significant source of innovations (von Hippel 1988),
epcially of IT innovations (von Hippel 2005). I do not claim that researchers
should attempt to solve practical problems exactly as they appear in practice.
A practical problem may be a conglomerate of different problems, and a piece
of research may not attempt to address the whole conglomerate but may focus
only on some specific subproblem. A practical problem may also be abstracted
to make it more general and easier to link to theories. One should note, however, that design science is also about potentiality. A new idea or artifact may
provide totally new opportunities to improve practice long before practitioners
recognize any problem. Many significant innovations in our field, such as the
relational data model and the first ideas of object-orientation, illustrate this.
Yet most design science research consists of incremental improvements to
existing artifacts, as illustrated by research into conceptual information modelling in the 1970’s and into object-oriented systems development in the 1990’s.
Typically, the marginal value of additional improvements decreases until the
research gradually fades out.9 An understanding of existing comparable
artifacts is essential in design science research, however, since the novelty and
contribution of new artifacts must be evaluated in the light of the existing
ones.
It is also well-known that analogies and metaphors stimulate creativity
(Couger et al. 1993). In the case of IT artifacts, for instance, cognitive and biological theories have provided useful metaphors for computing, such as neural
networks and genetic algorithms. The desktop metaphor led to the graphical
user interfaces which are dominant nowadays. The spreadsheet metaphor led
to spreadsheet software, which forms one of the most widely applied personal
productivity tools.
As discussed above, Walls et al. (1992) pioneered the idea that design science should be based on kernel theories. Ideally, kernel theories should serve
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as sources of ideas in design science research, but as pointed out above, the IS
research community may exaggerate the significance of kernel theories as
sources of new IT innovations.
Many authors associate design science with action research (Burstein and
Gregor 1999; Järvinen 2001; Cole et al. 2005; Järvinen 2007). This is understandable, since both attempt to change the world. Yet I wish to emphasize that
they are historically, practically, ontologically, epistemologically and
methodologically quite different and that in my view they should be kept conceptually clearly separate. As is well-known, action research has its roots in
Kurt Lewin and the socio-technical design movement (Baskerville and Myers
2004), whereas design science research has its roots in engineering. In terms
of van Aken (2004), action research has addressed more improvement problems than construction problems. It has been much more focused on ‘treating
social illnesses’ in organizations and other institutions. Technology change
may be part of that ‘treatment’, but the focus has been more on adopting technology than building it. Design science research, especially in engineering and
medicine, has focused on the construction of artifacts, most of them having
material embodiment.10 Even though it may be informed by practical problems, design science research, both the construction of new artifacts and their
initial evaluation (testing), is usually done in laboratories that are clearly separated from potential clients.
Most design science research in engineering and medicine, for example,
adopts a realistic or materialistic ontology, whereas action research at least
accepts a more nominalistic, idealistic and constructivist ontology (Burrell and
Morgan 1979; Iivari et al. 1998; Niiniluoto 1999). As Niiniluoto (1999) points
out, materialism attaches primacy to World 1 in Popper’s classification and
idealism to World 2. Action research, however, is interested in institutions of
World 3, which is socially constructed. As a consequence, design science
research, especially in engineering and medicine, has reflected a positivistic
epistemology (Burrell and Morgan 1979) both in terms of knowledge applied
from reference disciplines (such as physics, chemistry and biology) and
knowledge produced (design product knowledge, technical norms and technological rules), whereas action research is very strongly based on an anti-positivistic epistemology. Actually, one can claim that the very idea of action
research is anti-positivistic in its epistemology. Each client organization is
unique, with its own problems, and therefore one cannot treat all organizations
using the same medication.
As a consequence, my conclusion is just the opposite to that of Cole et al.
(2005), who maintain that design science and action research share important
assumptions regarding ontology and epistemology.
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One explanation for this discrepancy may be that Cole et al. (2005) implicitly limit design science to information systems in an organizational context.
One can question if the ontology and epistemology of design science research
might be different, when it specifically focuses on IT artifacts to be used in
institutional organizational contexts in World 3. Based on my own work on
paradigmatic assumptions regarding systems development approaches (Iivari,
1991; Iivari, 1998), I am doubtful. It was found that all seven IS development
approaches (or schools of thought) analysed in Iivari (1991) shared a fairly
realistic ontology and positivistic epistemology, whereas Iivari et al. (1998)
deliberately focused on five IS development approaches that contrasted with
the paradigmatic assumptions identified in Iivari (1991). These examples
illustrate that instances of design science research constructing quite comparable IT artifacts may differ in their ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Despite the differences between design science and action research, I do
not claim that they are mutually exclusive. Action research may well be used
to evaluate artifacts developed in design science, and it may also provide
information on how to improve those artifacts. We have ample examples of
the application of such action research in the context of the developing of IS
development methods (ETHICS and ISAC, for example).11 My claim is,
however, that artifacts developed in design science should first be tested in
laboratory and experimental situations as far as possible. One should not start
with testing in the real situations, except perhaps in very exceptional, special
situations.

5 The Ethics of Design Science
Design science research in itself implies an ethical change from describing
and explaining of the existing world to shaping it. The ethics of research concern the responsibility of a scientist for the consequences of his research and
its results. Even though it may be questionable whether any research can be
value-free, it is absolutely clear that design science research cannot be. Consequently, the basic values of research should be expressed as explicitly as possible.
Adapting Chua (1986), Iivari (1991) distinguishes three potential roles for
Information Systems as an applied discipline: 1) means-end oriented, 2) interpretive, and 3) critical. In the first case the scientist aims at providing means
knowledge for achieving given ends (goals), without questioning the legitimacy of those ends. According to Chua (1986), the aim of an “interpretivist
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scientist is to enrich people's understanding of their action”, “how social order
is produced and reproduced” (p. 615). The goals (ends) of action are often not
so clear, and one should also focus on unintended consequences. A critical scientist sees that research has “a critical imperative: the identification and
removal of domination and ideological practice” (p. 622). Goals (ends) can be
subjected to critical analysis.12
Much design science research is naturally means-end oriented. This concerns especially constructive research involved with the building of artifacts.
But constructive research can also be critical, as exemplified by the Scandinavian trade-unionist systems development approach (Bjerknes et al., 1987).
Evaluation studies can be means-end oriented, interpretive and/or critical,
where a means-end oriented evaluation is only interested in how effectively
the artifact helps achieve the given goals or ends, an interpretive piece of evaluation research may attempt to achieve a rich understanding of how an IT artifact is really appropriated and used and what its effects are, without confining
the focus on the given ends of its initial construction, and a critical study is
interested in how an IT artifact enforces or removes unjustified domination or
ideological practices.
More concretely, one can also question the values of IS research, i.e. whose
values and what values dominate it, emphasizing that research may openly or
latently serve the interests of particular dominant groups. The interests served
may be those of the host organization as perceived by its top management,
those of IS users, those of IS professionals or potentially those of other stakeholder groups in society.

6 Summary
The ideas put forward here can be summarized in the following twelve theses:
1. Information Systems is ultimately an applied discipline.
2. Prescriptive research is an essential part of Information Systems as an
applied discipline.
3. The design science activity of building IT artifacts is an important part
of prescriptive research in Information Systems.
4. The primary interest of Information Systems lies in IT applications and
therefore Information Systems as a design science should be based on
a sound ontology of IT artifacts and especially of IT applications.
5. Information Systems as a design science builds IT meta-artifacts that
support the development of concrete IT applications.
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6. The resulting IT meta-artifacts essentially entail design product and
design process knowledge.
7. Design product and design process knowledge, as prescriptive
knowledge, forms a knowledge area of its own and cannot be reduced
to the descriptive knowledge of theories and empirical regularities.
8. Constructive research methods should make the process of building IT
meta-artifacts disciplined, rigorous and transparent.
9. Explication of the practical problems to be solved, the existing artifacts
to be improved, the analogies and metaphors to be used, and/or the
kernel theories to be applied is significant in making the building
process disciplined, rigorous and transparent.
10. The term ‘design theory’ should be used only when it is based on a
sound kernel theory.
11. Information Systems as a design science cannot be value-free, but it
may reflect means-end, interpretive or critical orientation.
12. The values of design science research should be made as explicit as
possible.
The first thesis attempts to strengthen the practical orientation of Information Systems by reminding us that, as an applied discipline, it is interested in
how to change the world, and not only how the world is. This does not mean
that IS research comprises only ‘applied research’, even though prescriptive
research is essential to Information Systems (Thesis 2). Prescriptive research
should not confined only to practical implications of descriptive theories
(Benbasat and Zmud 2003), but comprises design science research of building
IT artifacts (Thesis 3).
The present essay suggests the three worlds of Popper (1978) as a general
ontology for design sciences. Thesis 4 expresses the need for a special World 3
ontology for IT applications. In line with Walls et al. (1992), Thesis 5 reminds
us that Information Systems as a design science attempts to build IT meta-artifacts rather than concrete IT applications. Thesis 6 points out that these IT
meta-artifacts are essentially knowledge (Hevner et al. 2004), while Thesis 7
underlines the fact that prescriptive knowledge and descriptive knowledge are
distinct realms of knowledge and that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. The current ‘obsession’ of leading IS journals (such as MIS Quarterly and
Information Systems Research) with theory may by dysfunctional from the
viewpoint of design science if it is required that all contributions of design science research must have a strong grounding in theory (see footnote 12).
Recognizing that the question of how to build IT artifacts in design science
research (Hevner et al. 2003) is relatively poorly understood, Thesis 8
expresses the need for disciplined, rigorous and transparent constructive
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research methods. It is this methodological rigor that distinguishes Information Systems as design science from the practice of building of IT artifacts.
Thesis 9 suggests that the building process may be based on practical problems, existing artifacts to be improved, analogies and metaphors, and/or kernel
theories, allowing, by contrast with Walls et al. (1992), that IT meta-artifacts
are necessarily to be based on kernel theories. Thesis 10 attempts to prevent
any artificial ‘theoretization’ of design science by suggesting that if an IT
meta-artifact is not based on any sound kernel theory, one should not call it
‘design theory’ (Gregor 2006).
The final two theses emphasize the significance of values in design science
research, claiming that they should be as explicit as possible.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

I recognize that the term ‘applied science’ is problematic. First, there is
considerable controversy over whether it is appropriate to make a distinction
between pure/basic science/research and applied science/research (see
Niiniluoto, 1993). Second, there is also a controversy over whether
technology is just applied science and technological knowledge reducible to
applied science (Gardner 1994, 1995). Despite these problems, I find the
distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ useful in the case of disciplines. A
pure discipline is primarily interested in how the world is, whereas an applied
discipline is interested in how to change the world. Note that this does not
mean that an applied discipline such as Information Systems should include
only ‘applied research’.
The stimulating article by Beckman (2002) suggests a more refined ontology
of artifacts which distinguishes four worlds: The realm of physics, the realm
of biology, the realm of mind, and the realm of artifacts.
The Manhattan project for developing the first atomic bomb was one of the
biggest design science research projects in the history of the humankind. The
project was successful in the sense that it managed to build the bomb, but
what was the utility of that project? To whom? It demonstrated, however, that
the physical theory behind the atomic bomb (nuclear fission) was valid.
I dropped the normative level of the original framework of Chmielewicz
(1970) and Lehtovuori (1973). The level of economic philosophy has a
normative research goal concerned with values, which according to
Lehtovuori (1973) do not have any truth value. It is still a controversial
question whether one can make ‘ought-to’ conclusions based on ’what is’.
At the time of my dissertation I was not aware of true nature of the book by
Herbert Simon on “The Science of the Artificial” (1969). I thought that was
about Artificial Intelligence, and thus overlooked it.
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6.

The editorial policy of MIS Quarterly requires that submissions to its research
article department “have a strong grounding in theory, whether it is a new
theory the authors are advancing or an existing theory the authors are testing,
refining, or challenging” (http://www.misq.org/roadmap/standards.html,
accessed 2.12.2006). Similarly, the editorial policy of Information Systems
Research expects that research article submissions “should have a strong
grounding in theory. Such a theory could either be a new theory that the
authors are advancing or an existing theory the authors are illustrating, testing,
refining, challenging, or simply applying.” (http://iol-a.informs.org/site/ISR/
index.php?c=11&kat=Submission+Guidelines, accessed 2.12.2006).
7. In fact, Walls at al. (1992) fall into this trap. They suggest that the information
systems development life-cycle is a design theory, although I am not aware of
any kernel theory on which it is based.
8. Gyro Gearloose is a fictional character created by Carl Barks for the Walt
Disney company. The purpose of using this figure to symbolize inventors in
the field is not to ridicule them, but quite the contrary.
9. One can, of course, observe a similar phenomenon in descriptive research, as
illustrated by the extensions of the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis et
al., 1989).
10. In the case of medicine design science research refers to the development of
new drugs and treatments.
11. Recognizing the nature of systems development methods and approaches as
‘ways of thinking’, ‘ways of control’, ‘ways of modeling’, ‘ways of working’
and ‘ways of support’ (ter Hofstede and van der Weide, 1992), one can claim
that a research approach that combines design science research and action
research is particularly appropriate when developing systems development
methods. Even in this case I am not sure that the systems development
method should primarily be constructed in an action research context. Action
research may be used in the evaluation (testing) and refinement of the method.
12. Note that Iivari (1991) applied the above distinction as an ethical dimension,
whereas Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) applied a very similar distinction as
an epistemological dimension. The critical perspective clearly illustrates the
problem with the epistemological dimension. Critical research may apply
either a positivistic or an anti-positivistic epistemology.
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